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1 Introduction
Nowadays,”as actual trends in economic development increase the likeli-
hood that wealth will be generated by a smaller proportion of total population
[...] the redistributive function of the public sector is likely to become more
important than ever” (Hobsbawm (1996)). Moreover, such a function seems
primarily important in front of increasing poverty and inequality in both devel-
oped and developing countries. Hence, as social tensions have recently testified,
the design of poverty alleviation programs and newly-arranged redistributive
policies will become a central issue in the architecture of sustainable welfare
systems. These policies may be arranged in at least two diﬀerent ways.
On the one hand, policy makers may decide to implement reforms of existing
redistributive tools. Re-designing taxation in order to make traditional social
security schemes more inclusive may be an example. In this case, the policy
alleviation eﬀort is undertaken re-allocating social costs and benefits through a
new structure of traditional taxation schemes. From this perspective, Makdissi
and Wolon (2002) have discussed a possible reform of commodities taxation
regimes and its impact on aggregate income poverty.
On the other, policy makers may design a targeted poverty alleviation pro-
gram. We define it as a supplementary poverty alleviation intervention indepen-
dently financed through an anchored tax and accompanied to well-established
social security systems or mean-tested benefits. Two fairly famous tools for
redistributing income inside a poverty alleviation program are: a participation
income (PI) (Atkinson (1996)) defined as a basic income paid conditional on
the participation to the social contract (through some form of recognized social
contribution3) and a negative income tax (NIT) (Friedman (1962)) that may be
seen as a proportional subsidy targeted to poor income-earners.
Surprisingly so far, few contributions have tried to give insights on the op-
timal architecture of these two redistributive tools. Atkinson (1995) has intro-
duced a model in which it is possible to determine the optimal basic income
and the welfare maximizing anchored flat rate tax in an economy with infinitely
many well-endowed workers and disable or sick citizens. Groot and Peeters
(1997) have, for instance, compared in terms of incentives to eﬃciency a neg-
ative income tax and a basic income in a eﬃciency-wages model with workers
and firms. Nevertheless, no attempts have been undertaken to derive optimality
conditions for a PI or a NIT inside economies where poverty is present. Hence,
using income as reference space, we characterize an economy with poors and
non-poors and we derive some conditions, in the case of flat-rate taxation, un-
der which the above redistributive tools are optimally designed. As it will be
clearer below, our set up is a two-sided extension of the well-known model of
basic income proposed by Atkinson (1995). First of all, it does include poverty
3As stressed by many authors a wide definition of social contribution may be accepted.
It may include engaging approved forms of education, training, caring for others, voluntary
activities etc... .
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considering poor and non-poor workers. Secondly, it is able to deal with the
similar case of the introduction of a negative income tax.
Furthermore, we deduce eﬀectiveness conditions for both instruments using a
well-defined poverty measure: the Hagenaars’s index (Hagenaars (1987)). Sev-
eral reasons are for such a measure instead of a simpler one (e.g. a poverty gap
ratio or some headcount ratio based measures). On one hand, if the introduction
of a PI/NIT reduces poverty such a mitigation is obtained through progressive
transfers. Thus, we need a poverty measure, like the Hagenaars’ one, which
satisfies a progressive transfer axiom4 being sensitive to the redistribution of in-
come within poors and non-poors. On the other, a too high tax rate applied on
non-poors’ incomes for financing the introduction of a PI or a NIT may induce
some agents to cross the poverty line thus changing the number of the poors
even with the same aggregate poverty gap. As known any poverty gap-related
index does not satisfy neither a non-poverty growth axiom nor a poverty growth
axiom (Kundu and Smith (1983)) contrary to the Hagenaars’ Measure. Finally
as stressed by Zheng (1997), the Hagenaars’ Index is one of the few poverty
indices which does satisfy almost any nice property for an aggregate poverty
measure.
The format of the remainder of the paper is as follows: section 2 introduces
our set up. Optimality conditions are derived and discussed for a PI and a NIT
in section 3. Section 4 provides a necessary condition for their eﬀectiveness in
poverty reduction interventions. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Set Up
Let us consider a finite population of participative agents and normalize, without
loss of generality, it at one. A share η of individuals have no current job (i.e.
sick, unemployed, disables) and 1 − η agents actually are hired in the labor
market.
Agents’ preferences are represented by an indirect utility function symmetric
for any agent
v = vi (p;wi,M) = v (wi,M) (1)
where p are fixed market prices, wi is the nominal earned wage and M are
non-labor incomes. As usual, such a function is traditionally assumed strictly
increasing and quasi-convex. Any worker supplies labor according to a supply
function L = L(wi,M) with L = 0 if i belongs to the fraction η of the population.
4For a discussion of transfer axioms see Zheng (1997).
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Only non-workers receive a non-labor income equal to fM from existing social
security systems. All other agents do not have any non-labor income.
Denote with li the hours of labor supplied by a worker receiving a net mar-
ket wage equal to wi. Workers are identical except for their earned wages and
they are distributed with respect to wi according to a distribution function
F (wi).Furthermore, let us suppose that a lower and an upper bound are insti-
tutionally fixed for wages i.e. wi ∈ [w;w] .
In order to assess poverty, a government sets an expenditure-oriented poverty
line z (with z > fM) aimed to identify working poors and to allow the calculation
of poverty rates or poverty gaps5. Then, the set of income poors is given by any
member of the portion η of the population plus any worker with wili ≤ z6 or
alternatively with wi ≤ w0 = z/li.
Hence, it is possible to define:
(1− η) =
X
i:w≤wi<w0
p (wi) +
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
f (wi) (2)
denoting with p the mass function of F (wi) with respect to working poors7
and f the corresponding function for non-poor workers.
Consistently, the social welfare in our economy is given by:
W = ηΨ
³
v
³fM´´+ X
i:w≤wi<w0
Ψ (v(wi, 0)) p (wi) +
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
Ψ (v (wi, 0)) f (wi)
(3)
where Ψ is a not decreasing and non-convex transformation of individual
utilities.
In absence of any poverty alleviation program, the individual poverty gap is
equal to g(wi) = z − wili for wi < w0 and the aggregate poverty gap is given
by:
G = η
³
z − fM´+ X
i:w≤wi<w0
(z − wili))p(wi) (4)
5For nice surveys on poverty lines see Lanjouw (2000) and Bjorkw (2000).
6We are assuming that such an income is determined after any direct or indirect form of
taxation.
7 In expression (2) a weak definition of poverty is used. A worker is poor whereas his wage
is strictly lower than the poverty line-related value of earned wage.
4
where the second term on the right hand side indicates the aggregate poverty
gap referred to working poors (henceforth bG) Finally, the Hagenaars’ Index
slightly modified consistently with our set up is equal to:
H =

1−
ln
³fM´
ln z

+ 1
µ
X
i:w≤wi<w0
µ
1− ln (wili)
ln z
¶
(5)
where µ is the portion of working poors in our economy.
3 Optimal PI and NIT in presence of Poverty
In order to reduce aggregate poverty, a policy maker decides to introduce a
participatory income (b). Such an income is given to any participative agent,
independently by its current position into the job-market and it is financed by
flat-rate labor income tax (t) levied on non-poors’ labor income. Consistently,
the government budget constraint is given by8:
b = t
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
wiL (wi,M) f(wi) (6)
Optimality conditions for the introduction of a participatory income may
be obtained maximizing (3) with respect to b, taking into account (6) and that
now M = b > 0 for any worker in our economy.
Proposition 1 A Participation Income is optimal if the aggregate expected
marginal benefit for poors and non-poors is equal to the marginal cost of public
funds.
Proof. Maximize the following Lagrangian wrt b and t:
L = ηΨ
³
v
³fM + b´´+ X
i:w≤wi<w0
Ψ (v(wi, b)) p (wi) + (7)
+
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
Ψ (v ((1− t)wi, b)) f (wi)− λ

b− t
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
wiL (wi, b) f(wi)


8Given our normalisation is straightforward to see that the aggregate partecipation income
is equal to B = b.
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where λ ≥ 0 is the marginal cost of public funds. With Ψ0 = ∂Ψ∂v > 0,
γ = ∂v∂b > 0 and γ
0
=
∂v(fM)
∂b > 0 we get the following foc:
ηΨ0γ
0
+E{i:w0≤wi≤w}(Ψ0γ) +E{i:w≤wi<w0}(Ψ0γ)− λ+ λt
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
wi
∂L
∂b f(wi) = 0
(8)
where E indicates the expected value. Calling φ the net marginal benefit,
for each group of agents, normalizing it by λ and using (8), we get the following
optimality condition:
Υ+E{i:w≤wi<w0} (φi) +E{i:w0≤wi≤w} (φi) = 1 (OC1)
where Υ = ηΨ
0
γ
0
λ , φi =
Ψ0γ
λ for working poors and φi =
Ψ0γ
λ + twi
∂L
∂b for
any non-poor worker; that is exactly what stated in the proposition.
As it is straightforward to notice looking at φi for non-poor agents, in pres-
ence of wealth eﬀects (i.e. ∂L∂b < 0) the introduction of a PI induces a severe
reduction of their labor supply and consequently a smaller amount of yield
available for financing the PI. Moreover,the expected net marginal benefit for
non-poors may be negative whereas above eﬀects are suﬃciently strong. In this
case, optimality imposes higher expected net marginal benefits for the rest of
the population with a smaller participation income. From convexity of v, this
will be more likely the relatively richer working poors and non-workers are.
With no wealth eﬀects (i.e. ∂L∂b = 0), condition (OC1) can be written as:
ηΨ
0
γ
0
+ 2E{i:w≤wi≤w}(Ψ
0
γ) = λ (9)
Following (10), the aggregate expected net marginal benefit for workers (poor
and non-poors) must increase whereas the marginal cost of public funds in-
creases. As above, if introducing a PI is particularly expensive optimality re-
quires a low aggregate poverty in our economy. Symmetrically, an optimal PI
may be sustained also in presence of deep income poverty if the marginal cost
of public funds is relatively low .
Finally a more evident observation. Whether the portion of non-workers
increases, the expected net marginal benefit for workers has ceteris paribus,
to be reduced. Hence, the optimal PI in an economy with a large fraction of
disable, sick or unemployed persons has to be small given the small tax base
available. In economies where this coincide with generally high costs of public
funds, this could involve an almost zero optimal PI.
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Alternatively, let us imagine that a policy maker might introduce a negative
income tax (NIT) for supporting working poors’ incomes. In its simplest formu-
lation, a NIT may be seen as a flat-rate subsidy equal to s for any agent with
a positive poverty gap. In the case of a flat rate tax levied on non-poors’ labor
incomes, the government budget constraint is given by:
s
X
i:w≤wi<w0
(z − wili) p(wi) = t
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
wiLf(wi) (10)
since non-workers do not receive any additional transfer. The available in-
come is consequently fM. On the contrary, any working poor receives an amount
of non-labor income equal to sg (wi) where, as defined above, g is the individual
poverty gap.
Then, we can show the following:
Proposition 2 A negative income tax is optimal if the working poors’ expected
marginal benefit, weighted by their individual poverty gaps, minus the expected
marginal loss of yield due to wealth eﬀects on non-poors labor supply is propor-
tional to the aggregate poverty gap of the economy.
Proof. Maximizing wrt s the following Lagrangian:
L = ηΨ
³
v
³fM´´+ X
i:w≤wi<w0
Ψ (v(wi, sg (wi))) p (wi) +
+
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
Ψ (v ((1− t)wi; 0)) f (wi) +
−λ

s
X
i:w≤wi<w0
(z − wili) p(wi)− t
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
wiLf(wi)

 (11)
we obtain the following foc:
E{i:w≤wi<w0}(φig (wi))−
X
i:w≤wi<w0
g(wi)p(wi) + t
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
wi
∂Li
∂s f(wi) = 0
(12)
where φ{i:w≤wi<w0} =
Ψ0σ
λ , σ =
∂v
∂s > 0 and
∂Li
∂s < 0 if some relevant wealth
eﬀects exist. Equivalently, condition (13) may be written as:
E{i:w≤wi<w0}(φig (wi))−E{i:w0≤wi≤w}
µ
twi
¯¯¯¯
∂Li
∂s
¯¯¯¯¶
= bG (OC2)
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that is exactly our proposition.
Expression (OC2) implicitly features the optimal negative income tax. All
other things equal„ the expected marginal benefit of a negative income tax
must augment if the working poors’ cumulative poverty gap increases. Given
the convexity of v and working poors now relatively less rich, it involves an
higher value for the optimal NIT. In opposition, the optimal NIT can be reduce
in correspondence of a small bG .
Additionally, an high expected loss of yield due to strong wealth eﬀects
means less resources for financing the poverty alleviation program and hence a
smaller optimal NIT. In this case for attaining optimality an higher increase in
working poors’ expected marginal benefit with a reduced negative income tax
is needed. This will be possible only if the latter are relatively richer.
Finally, without wealth eﬀects (i.e. ∂Li∂s = 0) it must be true that:
E{i:w≤wi<w0}(φig (wi)) = bG (13)
where the discussed relation is even more straightforward to notice. Finally,
maximizing the two Lagrangian with respect to t we get the same foc:
E{i:w0≤wi≤w}(Ψ0
∂v
∂t ) + λ
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
wiLf(wi) + λt
X
i:w0≤wi≤w
wi
∂L
∂t f(wi) = 0
(14)
With some manipulations and using the Roy’s Identity, condition (14) leads
to the following optimality condition for the anchored flat rate tax:
et
1− et = E{i:w0≤wi≤w} (wiL (1− φi))E{i:w0≤wi≤w}(wiLε) (15)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution between labor supply and wage.
Expression (15) is a slight modification of the traditional Ramsey Rule as noticed
and explained in Atkinson (1995) (cfr.pp.36-37).
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4 A necessary condition for Poverty Reduction
using PI or NIT
Optimality conditions may not coincide with conditions for eﬀectiveness of a PI
and a NIT in alleviating aggregate poverty. The following proposition adds to
conditions (OC1) and (OC2) a necessary conditions for eﬀectiveness. As we will
see, even here wealth eﬀects play a crucial role.
Proposition 3 Independently by the composition of the set of poors, the Ha-
genaars’ poverty measure will surely decrease in b and s only if there are no
relevant wealth eﬀect on working poors’ labor supply.
Proof. Since a PI and NIT a progressive income transfers, these may modify
the composition of the set of poors persons. Thus, there are four possible cases:
(i) PI and no agents are crossing the poverty line. In this case the Hagenaars’
Index is equal to
H =

1−
ln
³fM + b´
ln z

+ 1
µ
X
i:w≤wi<w0
µ
1− ln (wiL+ b)
ln z
¶
(16)
with µ equal to the portion of working poors. It is straightforward to see
that ∂H∂b < 0 only if
∂L
∂b = 0
(ii) PI and some agents are crossing the poverty line. Now, the Hagenaars’
Index is equal to
H =

1−
ln
³fM + b´
ln z

+ 1
µ0
X
i
µ
1− ln (wiL+ b)
ln z
¶
+ (17)
+
1
k
X
j
µ
1− ln ((1− t)wjL+ b)
ln z
¶
(18)
with µ 6= µ0 and k equal to the portion of non-poors who have crossed from
above the poverty line because of excessive fiscal pressure. Again, the above
conclusion holds.
(iii) NIT and no agents are crossing the poverty line. Now the index is equal
to
H =

1−
ln
³fM´
ln z

+ 1
µ
X
i
µ
1− ln (wiL+ sg (wi))
ln z
¶
(19)
and the above conclusion may easily be obtained.
The same it is true for the last case.
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Working poors’ labor supply responsiveness is the key element in ensuring a
poverty alleviation eﬀect of our redistributive measures. A PI involves perverse
eﬀects on poverty if working poors suddenly reduces their labor supply, thus
receiving lower labor income. This will be more likely, the lower is the individual
poverty gap. In other words, some well-known poverty trap eﬀects may lower the
impact of a participation income in alleviating poverty9. The same eﬀect may be
recognized for a NIT10. However in this case, since s decreases in correspondence
to less pervasive cumulative deprivation, it is reasonable that poverty trap eﬀects
will be remarkably mitigated.
5 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper is to provide some conditions for the utilization
of a PI or a NIT inside poverty alleviation programs. We show that the optimal
design of both measures crucially depends on the composition of the population
and the magnitude of wealth eﬀects on labor supply. Whereas strong wealth
eﬀects reduce non-poors’ labor supply, aggregate poverty has to be more perva-
sive in order to achieve optimality in the implementation of both redistributive
measures. In this case, the impossibility of levying high labor income taxes
on non-poor workers forces the government to introduce a relatively low PI or
NIT. Thus, they will be able to assure suﬃciently high net marginal benefits to
poor persons only if poverty is suﬃciently strong in the economy. If this is not
the case, PI and NIT may optimally introduced whereas the level of aggregate
poverty is not too high.
We also evaluate a necessary condition for eﬀectiveness of both tools, again
related to wealth eﬀects on working poors’ labor supply. Since poverty trap
eﬀects may strongly reduce the impact of a PI or a NIT on aggregate poverty,
it may be preferable to apply these redistributive policies in economies with
a suﬃciently weak preference for leisure time among poors in order to avoid
unpleasant substitutions between labor income and public transfers.
The centrality of wealth eﬀects seems here to reflect, as noticed by Van Parijs
(1996), that a basic income ”to which workers are unconditionally entitled [...]
enables them to filter out jobs that are not suﬃciently attractive”. If the size of
this eﬀect is large a basic income, but the same may be said for a NIT related
transfer, likely becomes a small sabbatical payment and a less eﬀective tool in
fighting poverty.
9For a design of the basic income proposal specifically aimed to deal with poverty trap
eﬀects see Groot (1997) or Creedy and Dawkins (2002).
10Ashenfelter and Plant (1990) provide an empirical estimation of labor supply responsive-
ness to the introduction of a NIT. Unfortunately their results present several ambiguities.
Diﬀerently, De Jager et al. (1996) simulate the introduction of a NIT in a small welfare state,
showing that, under some circumstances, the fall in labor supply may not coincide with an
higher unemployment rate. This result is explained, in their framework, by the increasing
attractiveness after a NIT is introduced of low-paid part-time jobs.
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Obviously, any change in the poverty line used by the government to identify
poors and non-poors alters the composition of the population and hence the
optimal anchored flat rate tax. Moreover, it modifies the optimal NIT, through
a diﬀerent aggregate poverty gap. Hence, a NIT seems more sensitive than a PI
to diﬀerent thresholds set in the space of income.
Finally, we hope that our analysis has shown a possible application of the
concepts of basic income11 and negative income tax in poverty studies. Further
researches may introduce in our set up non-linear taxation schemes or diﬀeren-
tiated public transfers.
11This set up may be easily extended to diﬀerent notions of basic income suggested by social
scientists. For instance, if we adopt the notion of citizen income proposed by Robertson (1996)
(i.e. a basic income paid to any citizen partecipative or not), we may introduce a fraction β
of non-partecipative agents, hence defining the portion of workers as 1− β − η.
11
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